Tariffs, trade & trepidation: Restructuring quarterly review & 2H 2025 outlook

Article    June 03, 2025
* This posting includes financial news and macroeconomic events as of May 30, 2025
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The Accordion view

The juggernaut of trade and economic news since early April 2025 has introduced a level of uncertainty to financial markets not seen since the COVID pandemic. The dizzying macro, trade, and unemployment events—against a backdrop of high interest rates and stubborn inflation—whipsawed markets. Following Trump’s April 2nd Liberation Day tariffs, equities plummeted, credit spreads widened, and then slowly, a slew of seemingly positive news emerged:

  • On May 28, A U.S. trade court blocked most of President Donald Trump’s tariffs in a sweeping ruling, stating the president overstepped his authority by imposing across-the-board duties on imports from U.S. trading partners. The Court of International Trade said the Constitution gives Congress exclusive authority to regulate commerce (which is not overridden by the President’s emergency powers). However, on May 29, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit restored Trump’s ability to levy tariffs using emergency powers, pending arguments from each party.
    • Prior to the ruling, reciprocal tariffs were beginning to ease universally; they were paused for most countries and decreased to a universal 10% rate. Additionally, China was lowered to 30%, tariffs set for Canada and Mexico were paused, and a June 1 deadline set for 50% tariffs on goods from the EU was eased.
  • As Q1 earnings closed in mid-May, ~80% of companies reported EPS above consensus. Earnings were also ~8.5% above estimates, confounding talks of a recession.
  • April unemployment remained unchanged at 4.2% while 177,000 jobs were added, with health care, transportation, and financial jobs growing.
  • From its April 8th bottom, equity markets rebounded 20% by the end of May, one of only six times in the last 75 years the market recovered so quickly over an eight-week period.
  • The high-yield market never confirmed the panic that was being shared by economists; HY spreads widened to ~450bps in April, but if a recession was imminent, we would see spreads increase to ~700bps (which have only happened 4x in 20 years). They never did.

While these short-term anecdotes are refreshing, we would caution they belie weakening fundamentals that are extensions of longer term, troubling trends.  While Q1 earnings were indeed stronger than expected, management communications to investors on forward earnings tell a different story. Additionally, the following macro trends are what concern us as we assess the restructuring outlook for the second half of 2025:

  • While tariff rates will soften, and potentially some may be eliminated given the court’s ruling, significant cost increases may still need to be borne by companies or passed onto their customers.
  • Unemployment is rising and projected to be at 4.7% by year-end, the highest since Sep 2021. Excluding 2020-21’s spike, the rate has not been >4.7% since Jan 2017.
  • After the May 6-7th FOMC meeting, the Fed is now expected to cut rates only once or twice in 2025 (down from 3x as recently as Q1), keeping financing costs higher for longer.In its latest minutes, the news was further worrisome: the possibility of recession was “almost as likely as the baseline forecast,” with inflation expected to rise “markedly” in 2025 with unemployment rising above its natural rate through 2027.
  • Consumer sentiment is sharply souring and starting to impact short-term spending.
  • A four-pronged credit crunch is facing America: commercial real estate (CRE), corporate, consumer, and government debt – all peaking simultaneously.

We believe the following mitigating actions are paramount for management teams and creditors as underlying weakness exacerbates into 2H2025 and through year-end:

  1. Ongoing tariff uncertainty is creating operational disruption and the need to assess alternative sourcing strategies.
  2. Continued fears of a recession are requiring proactive development of financial continency plans to reduce cash burn and maintain covenant compliance.
  3. Tightening credit conditions are resulting in fewer options to refinance and restructure, and strained liquidity is driving the need for closer monitoring and management.
  4. Bankruptcy filings—despite serving as a refuge of last resort—are continuing to increase as management teams view filing as a strategic tool to effectuate transactions.

How management teams are handling uncertainty surrounding tariffs

During 2025, much has been discussed about the implications of tariffs and how to adequately plan for their rollouts. First, higher input costs and unpredictable pricing are expected to squeeze margins, particularly for any company which relies on foreign manufacturing and suppliers.  Second, operational challenges—supply chain disruptions, shifting to non-tariff regions for production, and short-term supplier limitations/ inventory management—are vast and strain cash flow.  Lastly, along with a variety of other challenges, like limited bargaining power for small and medium sized businesses and introducing global competition as regions undercut prices, the administrative burden is enormous (to say the least).

On this last point, understanding tariff classifications and correctly classifying goods under the Harmonized Tariff Schedule (HTS), the source of truth for all pricing, is complex and requires expertise. Once visibility is provided on final trade deals, every company will need to complete a SKU by SKU reconciliation to the HTS and ensure adequate ongoing compliance—no small feat (or expense), particularly for products that have cross-country tariff dynamics (e.g. autos or complicated technology). As such, it is easy to understand why most management teams have not made material, if any, investments yet in building out new supply chains or substituting suppliers, only for the game to change on a dime.

So, after a volatile two months since Liberation Day, how are management teams actually navigating their companies, and what are they communicating to stakeholders with limited information?  While the restructuring market is dominated by private equity and capital, taking notes from public company management is invaluable for benchmarking appropriate actions across all industries and risk classes. After digesting the news related to tariff deals and pouring over Q1 earnings transcripts and management commentary from May, our team has found some key themes:

  1. Management teams have acknowledged that the financial impact from the rollout of tariffs on their businesses, especially in the piecemeal way it has been done, is impossible to predict and will be impossible to budget for and potentially significantly impact profits, even with softened trade deals.
  1. Given the unpredictable landscape as final tariff rates are pending, setting reasonable financial targets for even a few quarters is rife with risk. Growing numbers of management teams would rather suspend forward guidance and manage expectations appropriately than lead investors with misguided projections.

A striking number of public companies—38 as of mid-May—suspended forward financial guidance entirely, both quarterly and annually ( equivalent to the same number that did so only three weeks into the pandemic). Many others, in an effort not to scrap investors of all forward-looking visibility, have suspended certain parts of guidance during their April/May Q1 releases (annual or new customer acquisitions, for example) and retained either Q2 guidance or other types (e.g. gross margin).

While suspending guidance isn’t a direct indicator of a recession, the surge in guidance suspensions across multiple sectors (as seen in the following chart), especially among large-cap or economically sensitive companies, is a strong warning sign of economic distress. Manufacturing-related industries (auto, industrials) and all major airlines were included, as well as various consumer, retail, and restaurant companies.  United Airlines even took the bold move of issuing double guidance, which has been chided in later reports, due to the uncertainty of a downside case.

Suspending forward guidance during April / May 2025 earnings season: public companies by sector

  1. As unpopular as it may be, management teams have accepted they will either need to “eat” or pass through all or partial tariff-related cost increases to their customers and have begun to communicate this reality to all stakeholders.

The nuances of how much is “eaten vs passed” will be highly specific to the dynamics of each company, its operating environment, and its industry subsector.  Still, we will likely continue to see significant dislocations and stress as price hikes flow through P&Ls and sales volumes are negatively impacted by customers simply walking away.  This administration will also likely continue to urge companies to simply “‘EAT THE TARIFFS,’ and not charge valued customers ANYTHING” as it did with Walmart and Amazon and has made clear to communicate to other CEOs, urging minimal impacts to consumers.

  1. A conviction to not pass through price increases stems from scale, superior long-term planning and exceptional supply chain management/supplier diversification

While earlier in 2025 there were informal reports of companies reticent to raise prices on customers, Home Depot is the only public company that committed to “generally maintain [its] current pricing levels across [its] portfolio” during its earnings communications. This is possible due to their scale and the breadth of partnerships with suppliers, for which it can substitute goods based on short-term demand dynamics.  This competitive advantage is strengthened by its focus on supply chain flexibility for decades prior to recent tariff discussions.  This reality has sobering implications: small businesses or those without a local supplier network, including the vast majority of private capital-backed manufacturers, will likely not enjoy such pricing flexibility.

Recent market study

As management teams face the prospect of passing tariff-related costs onto customers—particularly within subsectors where parts are sourced abroad—the reality is stark. A recent market test conducted by Afina founder Ramon van Meer, a small US business owner, confirmed that US consumers are not interested in supporting US-made products if it will cost them more money to do so. The results: 0 (ZERO) US-made showerheads were purchased versus a cheaper Asian-sourced product.

Aside from the obvious effects on domestic manufacturers, the results of this study have real implications that challenge the “Bring Jobs Back to America” narrative for all industries: substituting foreign labor and input goods only work if the end product or service stays competitively priced.  In America’s higher wage environment, this means companies will have to take the margin hit or fail to more profitable competitors that have better (read: cheaper) supply chains.

What about the consumer?

Consumers play a big role to play in this tariff debacleand have reason to shirk higher prices. For the past two years, they have grappled with stubbornly high housing, food, and all discretionary good priceswith only recent relief in items such as gas and eggs. Consumer spending accounts for about ~68% of GDP and consumer sentiment has never been worse.  The Michigan Consumer Sentiment Index (MCSI), an important gauge of spending health for the US, dropped sharply to 50.8 in May 2025, the lowest reading since June 2022, and the second lowest on record. In this month’s survey, tariffs were spontaneously mentioned by ~75% of consumers, up from ~60% in April as uncertainty over trade policy continues to dominate consumers’ thinking. On the price front, inflation expectations for the year ahead surged to 7.3%, a new 1981-high from 6.5% and long-run inflation expectations edged up to 4.6% from 4.4%.

Consumers anticipate rising unemployment and elevated risks of personal job loss (three month moving average) Source: University of Michigan

Moreover, consumer fears of losing their own job within the next five years and their expectations of higher general unemployment both stand at the highest polled in the last 30 years, and in line with level of unemployment anxiety consumers faced during the Great Recession. This may be why we are starting to see some increase in the share of households making only the minimum payments on their credit cards, suggesting building pressures for some households.

Credit market update

Leveraged loans & high-yield bonds

Leveraged loans saw a record year in 2024, with $1.3 trillion in new issuance (beating 2017’s previous record of $985 billion) and a 260% increase over 2023’s $378 billion. Coming off a banner year, leveraged loan issuance began 1Q25 strong, with December 2024 and January 2025 monthly volumes at all-time highs. Optimism diminished in late Q1 through April after several U.S. tariff announcements, which led to spreads widening. Additionally, trade escalations and market uncertainty led to a sharp decline in loans trading over par at ~6%, well below the ~60% at year-end 2024. Overall issuances, driven by lower leveraged loans, fell sharply in March, which represented only 20% for the full quarter. Market conditions deteriorated further in April but recovered after the US-China trade de-escalation announced on May 12.  High-yield bond issuance for Q1 remained strong and consistent with the previous five quarters, at $68 billion.

While we expect to see covenants become more restrictive as we enter 2H2025, lenders through the first half of Q1 continued to deploy capital and lend into more distressed situations, with borrowers happy to refinance maturing loans with “covenant-lite” deals that extended the “kick-the-can” strategy employed over the past three years. During the quarter, we continued to see significant progress made towards the estimated $2.5-$2.8 trillion (and rising) maturity wall in 2025/2026, with approximately $305 billion (~76%) of the leveraged loan and high-yield bonds issued in Q1 2025 representing refinancings and recapitalizations, while only ~13% were acquisition-related (with the remainder for general corporate purposes).

Estimated US leveraged finance volume ($ billions) Source: Fitch/Debtwire (estimates)

Despite volatility seen in April and May, we continue to see high (but falling) issuance across the credit risk spectrum, although default rates and credit downgrades are expected to tick higher. The leveraged loan LTM default rate (including distressed exchanges) ended Q4 2024 at 4.2%, in line with the previous quarter, although well above ~1.0% levels during 2022.  While analysts are grappling with where the default rate will trend by year-end 2025, estimates are squarely higher than the ~4.0%-4.5% expectations seen in early 2025, with Fitch increasing its 2025 U.S. default rate forecast for leveraged loans as high as 5.5%-6.0%. Higher default expectations are driven by two key trends: one, rates staying higher for longer, with the Fed expected to cut rates twice in 2025 (or possibly only once), down from an expectation of three times as recently as Q1. Two, companies are preparing for the eventual input price increases and supply chain disruptions from final tariff rollouts later this year.

Distressed leveraged loan transactions on an LTM basis through March 2025 are most concentrated in the healthcare equipment and services and automotive/transport sectors (with each at 19% of activity) followed closely by retail (14%). Signs of exacerbating distress can also be seen here; at the end of April 2025, loan downgrades on an LTM basis outpaced upgrades by 2.7x, a material uptick from year-end 2024 (2.3x) and up from 2.0x the same time in 2024.  Additionally, as leveraged loan issuer default rates stay high, we are seeing companies struggling to meet cash flow demands, contributing to increases in payment-in-kind and selective defaults.

Leveraged loan default rate Source: PitchBook | LCD. Leveraged loan default rate on an LTM basis and includes distressed exchanges.

The rise in defaults and heightened downgrades should be monitored closely as these are typically leading indicators of forthcoming restructuring activity. In fact, default rates and downgrades as a proxy for distress may be understated given the increased Liability Management Exercises (LMEs) activity being undertaken. LMEs were explored in detail in our previous update.

Private credit update: Evergreen funds

Our previous market update provided an overview into traditional private credit structures, trends and benefits—particularly the speed and flexibility enjoyed by transaction participants. Another significant benefit of private credit is that it’s becoming more relevant as we head into a summer of global trade deals: its capital is “locked up”—investors commit funds for years, avoiding the risk of rapid withdrawals like the 2023 Silicon Valley Bank collapse. However, a newer type of private credit vehicle, “evergreen funds,” is introducing fresh risks, despite still being more stable than bank deposits.

These evergreen funds, offered by major sponsors like Blackstone and Apollo, allow investors to redeem a limited portion (typically up to 5% per quarter) of their holdings. While these vehicles have helped raise ~$300 billion from retail investors, they blur the line between stable institutional capital and more volatile retail money. Key features of evergreen funds include their perpetual structure (with capital continuously reinvested rather than returned after a fixed period), partial liquidity (typically offering small, quarterly redemptions), and appeal to retail investors. Funds are accessible via wealth managers at banks like Morgan Stanley and UBS that cater to affluent individuals who prefer some liquidity.

Evergreen funds are transforming private credit by bringing in less experienced retail investors and introducing more liquidity. This innovation brings benefits but also demands greater discipline from fund managers. While a full-scale run is unlikely, the sector risks slower returns, riskier lending, and growing pains if redemptions surge or assets underperform. Additionally, lack of transparent valuations may lead to distrust and sudden withdrawals, or in a potential recession, meeting redemptions could force funds to sell hard-to-trade assets like private loans at discounted prices.

Conclusion

Given the heightened risk over the last month—from tariff uncertainty, impacts on global supply chains and more cautious consumer sentiment, intensifying cost pressures amid heighted interest rates, and still stubborn inflation—we expect distress indicators to continue to rise and potentially peak into 2H 2025.  Credit market conditions suggest more defaults are to come due to increased cost pressures and a slower path to lower interest rates than that contemplated in late 2024.

We anticipate continued momentum in restructuring activity as aggressive out-of-court processes—including ever-evolving and to-be-court-tested LME structures—remain an initial strategic choice to extend maturities and manage liquidity.​ We also expect to see management teams execute operational restructurings (focusing on cost reductions and efficiency), asset sales to divest non-core assets to raise capital and reduce debt burdens and, once greater clarity around tariff deals is available, comprehensive assessments of supply chain diversification opportunities and substitutes of expensive input goods.

Sources and references

  1. PitchBook | LCD
  2. PitchBook
  3. Debtwire
  4. S&P Capital IQ Pro
  5. Fitch Ratings
  6. Bloomberg
  7. Reuters
  8. Bureau of Labor Statistics
  9. Industry Research
  10. Company earnings call transcripts and presentations

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